The California Agricultural Producer\u27s Lien, Processing Company Insolvencies, and Federal Bankruptcy Law: An Evaluation and Alternative Methods of Protecting Farmers by Bratton, Dale
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 36 | Issue 4 Article 4
1-1985
The California Agricultural Producer's Lien,
Processing Company Insolvencies, and Federal
Bankruptcy Law: An Evaluation and Alternative
Methods of Protecting Farmers
Dale Bratton
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dale Bratton, The California Agricultural Producer's Lien, Processing Company Insolvencies, and Federal Bankruptcy Law: An Evaluation
and Alternative Methods of Protecting Farmers, 36 Hastings L.J. 609 (1985).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol36/iss4/4
Note
The California Agricultural Producer's Lien,
Processing Company Insolvencies, and Federal
Bankruptcy Law: An Evaluation and
Alternative Methods of Protecting Farmers
Agriculture and related industries have been suffering economic
stress for the last decade. The resulting business failures in related indus-
tries have further burdened farmers. I California's multi-billion dollar ag-
ricultural industry2 has experienced its share of the financial pressure. In
the past ten years, two dozen canning companies in Northern California
have gone out of business. 3 Analysts of the industry predict that the
trend toward fewer processing and canning plants will continue.4 When
processing businesses fail, farmers are often among the unpaid creditors.5
The California Legislature has responded by adopting measures intended
to ameliorate the effects of processing company insolvencies on the
state's farmers. Presently, the most important such measure is the pro-
1. See, ag., In re Frosty Morn Meats, Inc., 7 Bankr. 988, 1002 app. A (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 1980) ("between 1958 and ... 1975 the failure of meatpackers resulted in losses of over
$43,000,000 to livestock producers"); Debtor's Statement of Affairs, In re T.H. Richards
Processing Co., No. 282-2614-W-7 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. filed July 9, 1982) (farmers were owed
$3.5 million in processing company insolvency in California); H.R. REP. No. 543, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2-4, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 405, 405-08 (slow payment and
nonpayment problems affecting produce farmers, who suffered losses of $64 million in 1982).
2. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTI-
CAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1984, at 663 (104th ed. 1983) (in 1982 California
had $14.32 billion total farm marketings for crops and livestock) [hereinafter cited as STATIS-
TICAL ABsTRACT]. Processing companies are major buyers of farm products. For example, in
1982 processing companies purchased $421 million worth of California tomatoes, while $148
million worth were purchased for the fresh produce market. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE, CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURE-1982, at 7 (1983).
3. San Francisco Examiner, Sept. 2, 1984, at D2, col. 3; see also STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT, supra note 2, at 768 (number of establishments manufacturing preserved fruits and
vegetables in the United States fell from 3528 in 1967 to 2379 in 1977).
4. Rough Times Ahead for Canning Industry?, FOOD ENGINEERING, Dec. 1980, at 70,
71 ("[Ihe most important change likely to occur in the 1980's [is] a further decline in the
number of canners."); see also Demand, Inputs Blast Canning Industry, CAL. FARMER, Sept. 3,
1983, at 13, 27 (number of small and medium-sized canneries in California has declined
sharply since 1957, "and the number is still dropping").
5. See, eg., sources cited supra note 1.
[609]'
ducer's lien, 6 which provides the farmer with a lien on his products sold
to a processing company until he receives payment for them. 7
The protection afforded the farmer by the producer's lien is most
critical if the processing company becomes involved in federal bank-
ruptcy proceedings. If the company becomes insolvent, the producer's
lien should make the farmer a secured creditor with a likelihood of
avoiding financial loss. 8 The federal bankruptcy system, however, re-
gards state-created liens9 like the producer's lien as potential disruptions
of federal supremacy in the regulation of bankruptcy. 10 The Bankruptcy
Code, I1 while generally recognizing state property law,1 2 has special pro-
visions invalidating certain statutory liens in federal bankruptcy proceed-
ings. 13 These provisions preclude the recognition of state statutory liens
that could not be enforced against a bona fide purchaser of the goods to
which the lien applies. 14 The producer's lien is subject to attack under
these provisions. The producer's lien therefore could be invalidated in
the one situation-bankruptcy-in which farmers most need its
protection.
In other states, grain farmers have encountered similar problems
following grain elevator insolvencies.' 5 Congress1 6 and several state leg-
islatures 17 have responded to grain industry problems by enacting legisla-
tion protective of grain farmers. The legislative measures for the grain
6. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§ 55631-55653 (West 1968 & Supp. 1985).
7. Id. §§ 55631, 55639.
8. See 11 U.S.C. § 506 (1982) (lien rights are generally protected in bankruptcy
proceedings).
9. See id. § 10 1(39) (defines "statutory lien" as a "lien arising solely by force of a statute
on specified circumstances or conditions"). This provision distinguishes such a lien from a
consensual lien: "[A] secured transaction within Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code is
contractual rather than statutory, even though without the statute the agreement of the parties
would not effectively create a lien valid under non-bankruptcy law." 4 COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTCY § 545.02 (15th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER].
10. International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 263-64 (1929); see U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 4.
11. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-15302 (1982).
12. Holt v. Crucible Steel Co., 224 U.S. 262 (1912); In re Leach, 15 Bankr. 1005, 1009
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1981); see COLLIER, supra note 9, § 545.04(2).
13. 11 U.S.C. §§ 545(1)-(4) (1982).
14. Id. § 545(2).
15. See generally Looney, Hamilton & Culver, Marketing Farm Products: The Farmer as
Creditor and Related Problems of Bankruptcy, 4 AGRIC. L.J. 565 (1983) (grain industry
problems); Note, A Survey of Current Issues and Legislation Concerning Grain Elevator Insol-
vencies, 8 J. CORP. L. 111 (1982).
16. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
§§ 350-354, 98 Stat. 333, 358-61 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a), 546, 557, 901(a) (1982))
(giving farmers who have stored grain in insolvent elevators expedited determination of their
right to the grain).
17. See Looney, Hamilton & Culver, supra note 15, at 575 (state insurance funds as re-
sponse to elevator insolvencies).
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industry provide useful comparisons for analysis of the California pro-
ducer's lien.
This Note analyzes the features of the producer's lien and the con-
flict it has engendered among California farmers, processing companies,
and lenders to processing companies. The Note discusses the federal
bankruptcy law regarding state statutory liens and evaluates the status of
the California producer's lien in federal bankruptcy proceedings. The
Note concludes that the producer's lien is probably invalid in bankruptcy
and suggests legislative improvements in the lien statute that would be
adequate to make the lien legally effective in bankruptcy. The Note also
considers the possibility that such a valid producer's lien would create
some significant economic costs for California farmers.
The Note then analyzes several alternative methods of protecting
farmers against financial loss in processor insolvencies. These alterna-
tives are treated in terms of their legal effectiveness in bankruptcy, their
scope of financial relief, and the direct and indirect costs they can impose
on farmers. The alternatives considered include changes in federal bank-
ruptcy law, establishment of a state or federal statutory trust in favor of
farmers selling their products to processors, an enlarged California state
insurance fund, high-coverage surety bonding of processors, and private
insolvency insurance. These methods of protecting farmers are com-
pared to the proposed amended California producer's lien. The Note
concludes that an enlarged state insurance fund would offer California
farmers the cheapest effective relief from financial losses threatened by
processor insolvencies.
The California Producer's Lien
Farmers raising vegetable and fruit crops produce perishable goods
which must be sold at harvest.' A farmer need not receive cash pay-
ment in full at harvest, however, and there can be tax advantages in
agreeing to deferred payment. 19 The processor purchasing a farmer's
crop benefits from deferred payment by spreading purchasing costs over
periods longer than the harvest season. Thus, processing companies
faced with high financing costs20 increasingly make deferred payment
18. Grain industry problems are somewhat different from the problems of other farm
industries because grain can be stored by the farmer in an elevator for long periods before sale.
See Note, supra note 15, at 117-20 (discussion of grain marketing).
19. Estes, Congress Rescues Farmer Deferred Crop Payment Contracts from IRS Attack, 3
AGRIC. L.J. 1, 9-11 (1981) (farmers can use such contracts to shift income from one crop year
to another for tax advantage).
20. Richardson & Pickett, Marketing Co-Ops Face a Time of Reckoning, CAL. FARMER,
Sept. 3, 1983, at 6 ("[C]ommodity canners have. . . gotten themselves into a cash crunch by
the increased use of debt in overall financing . . . . When interest rates soared [in recent
years], there was simply no way to finance this debt."); see The Man Who Tried to Save Cal
Can, CAL. FARMER, Nov. 5, 1983, at 50 (High interest rates in the 1980's cost California
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contracts with farmers. 21 Such contracts, however, expose farmers to the
risk of nonpayment for a variety of reasons, including the possible insol-
vency of their processors before payment is made.
The California producer's lien 22 seeks to improve the position of a
farmer who has not yet received payment for his products by making him
a secured creditor of the processing company which purchases his crop.
23
The lien statute provides that the sale to a processing company of any
farm products "grown by him" gives the farmer a lien on the products
"and upon all processed or manufactured forms"' 24 of them which are "in
the possession of the processor without segregation of such product.
25
The lien is for the contract price, or for the value of the farm products if
there is no agreed price.26 The lien attaches to the farm products "from
the date of delivery of such farm product or any portion of it" to the
processor 27 and is "complete from the date of delivery. . . , or, if there is
a series of deliveries" under a given contract, "from the date of the last
delivery."' 28 The statute requires no further steps, such as filing notice,
for the perfection of the lien. 29 The statute makes the producer's lien "a
preferred lien prior in dignity to all other liens, claims, or encum-
brances,"'30 except employee wage and salary claims3' and warehouse-
men's liens as provided by division 7 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
32
The producer's lien continues in force until the farmer releases the lien.
33
The farmer may release the lien upon payment or "upon arrangements
Canners & Growers, a major cannery, about $30 million per year. Cal Can filed for bank-
ruptcy in 1983.).
21. Demand, Inputs Blast Canning Industry, CAL. FARMER, Sept. 3, 1983, at 13, 27 (The
industry trend is towards "agreements made between large canners and farmers, in which
farmers receive final payments after processing and marketing of the crop.").
22. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§ 55631-55653 (West 1968 & Supp. 1985).
23. Id. § 55631.
24. Id.
25. Id. § 55634. The phrase "without segregation" is apparently aimed at the fact that
farm products sold to a processor are immediately commingled with other purchased
products.
26. Id. § 55631.
27. Id. § 55632. The time of attachment is the point at which the lien becomes effective
against the processor. See Bramble Transp., Inc. v. Sam Senter Sales, Inc., 294 A.2d 97, 102
(Del. Super. Ct. 1971) (defining attachment).
28. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 55635 (West 1968 & Supp. 1985). The term "com-
pleted" is apparently used for the more usual "perfected." Black's Law Dictionary defines
"perfected" as "completed." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1023 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). Perfection
is the completion of all steps required to make the lien effective against the processor's credi-
tors. See Bramble Transp., 294 A.2d at 102 (defining perfection).
29. See 1 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 435-37 (1965)
(discusses automatic perfection, for which no steps are required after attachment).
30. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 55633 (West Supp. 1985).
31. Id. § 55633(a).
32. Id. § 55633(b).
33. Id. § 55637 (West 1968).
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being made for such payment which are satisfactory" to him.
34
The lien statute prohibits a processor from moving farm products to
which producer's liens have attached "from this state or beyond [the
processor's] ownership or control," unless there is a sale of the products
and "the total proceeds of the sale are used to satisfy" the claims of
lienholding farmers.35 Violation of this provision by a processor is a
misdemeanor.
36
A farmer seeking to enforce his lien against a processor has several
choices. The farmer may obtain an injunction prohibiting removal of the
processed farm products beyond the reach of the court,37 or he may pro-
ceed with a foreclosure action.38 He may also file a personal action for
the debt without foregoing his lien rights.
39
Two of these general features of the lien stem from recent changes in
the law. In 1979 the California Legislature amended the producer's lien
statute, introducing two particularly important changes: an increase in
the lien's duration from sixty days to an indefinite period,40 and repeal of
a procedure permitting secured lenders to achieve priority over
lienholders.41 The legislature enacted these changes to strengthen the
position of farmers as against lenders to the processor. 42 The duration of
the lien was extended because a significant number of deferred payment
contracts provided for final payment as long as a year after delivery of
the farm products to the processor.43 Before the amendment, the protec-
tion of the lien ended too soon for many farmers.
In addition, prior to the amendment, the lien statute had qualified
the priority of the producer's lien by permitting the processor's secured
lender to obtain a security interest in the processor's inventory which
took precedence over the producer's lien.44 The lender obtained this pro-
34. Id. Lenders have seen in this language a possible way to include terms waiving the
lien protection in contracts between farmers and processors. See infra notes 48-59 & accompa-
nying text.
In addition, the farmer may release the lien upon the processor's posting of a security
bond, cash deposit, or other security. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 55637 (West 1968).
35. Id. § 55638.
36. Id. § 9.
37. Id. § 55651.
38. Id.
39. Id. § 55647.
40. Act of Sept. 22, 1979, 1979 Cal. Stat. ch. 969, § 3.
41. CAL. FOOD & AGRiC. CODE §§ 55681-55692 (West 1968) (repealed 1979).
42. Press release from California Assemblyman Floyd Mori (Mar. 7, 1979) (statement by
a sponsor of the amendments that banks can protect themselves better than farmers can be-
cause the banks have other methods of securing financial arrangements); Cal. Senate Comm.
on Judiciary, Analysis of A.B. 774, 1979-1980 Sess. 3-4 (1979) (giving same rationale for the
amendments) (copy on fie with the Hastings Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Analysis of
A.B. 774].
43. Analysis of A.B. 774, supra note 42, at 1-2.
44. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 55682 (West 1968) (repealed 1979).
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tection by filing a financing statement4 5 with the California Department
of Agriculture.46 Lenders made such extensive use of this procedure that
farmers seldom benefited from the statutory priority.
47
The 1979 amendments brought a prompt response from bank lend-
ers, who were particularly disturbed by the repeal of the special excep-
tion for the processor's secured lender.48 Some banks thereafter required
a major processor to include in its contracts with farmers a section enti-
tled "Release of Producer's Lien."'49 The contracts were pre-printed
form contracts prepared by the processing company, and their terms
were specified by the banks.50 The release terms were also printed on the
form in a section requiring separate signature.5 1 The release terms stated
that the producer's lien was being released by the farmer-seller in return
for "arrangements being made for. . . payment which are satisfactory to
the producer,"'5 2 the "satisfactory arrangements" being the deferred pay-
ment terms of the contract.5 3 Many farmers entering into these contracts
signed the release.5 4 In this way the banks ensured that their secured
claims to the processor's inventory would not be displaced by producer's
liens. 55
As a result, in the 1983-1984 legislative session, farming interests
sought further amendments to the producer's lien statute.5 6 They pro-
posed amendments to delete the provision for release of the lien "upon
arrangements being made for. . . payment which are satisfactory to the
producer. ' 57 Thus, lenders and processors would not be able to rely on
45. A financing statement is a document giving sufficient details about the debtor, credi-
tor, amount of the debt, and nature of the collateral to give adequate notice of the adverse
interest in the collateralized property. Cf CAL. COM. CODE § 9402(1) (West Supp. 1985)
(specifies what must be included in a Uniform Commercial Code financing statement in
California).
46. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 55682 (West 1968) (repealed 1979). The former provi-
sions also permitted a farmer to take steps to require a lender to withhold loan proceeds from a
processor to the extent the processor had not paid the farmer. Id. §§ 55687, 55689-55692.
Apparently, no farmer ever used these cumbersome provisions.
47. Analysis of A.B. 774, supra note 42, at 1-3.
48. See, e.g., Banks' Pretrial Statement at 5, In re T.H. Richards Processing Co., No.
282-2614-W-7 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. filed July 9, 1982).
49. See, e.g., id.
50. See, e.g., id.; 1981 Tomato Contract between T.H. Richards Processing Co. and vari-
ous farmers (copy on file with the Hastings Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Tomato
Contract].
51. See, e.g., Tomato Contract, supra note 50, at 2.
52. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 55637 (West 1968) (farmer could choose to release the
lien without receiving payment).
53. Tomato Contract, supra note 50, at 1.
54. See, e.g., Banks' Pretrial Statement at 5, In re T.H. Richards Processing Co., No.
282-2614-W-7 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. fied July 9, 1982).
55. Id.
56. A.B. 570, Cal. Leg. 1983-1984 Sess. (introduced Feb. 10, 1983, not enacted).
57. Id. § 1 (intended to amend CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 55637 (West 1968)).
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this statutory language for the validity of release terms included in con-
tracts with farmers. The amendments would have further added a decla-
ration that "[a]ny waiver by a producer of his or her rights to the
producer's lien. . . is void as contrary to public policy."' 58 The Legisla-
ture, however, did not adopt these amendments. 59
In sum, California has provided financial protection for farmers by
making them secured creditors of the farm-product processing compa-
nies. The form this protection takes, the producer's lien, has been the
object of political conflict among farmers, processing companies, and
lenders. The most serious challenge to the effectiveness of the producer's
lien, however, arises when a processing company becomes insolvent and
enters federal bankruptcy proceedings.
The Producer's Lien and Federal Bankruptcy Law
If a solvent California processing company fails to make contract
payments for farm products, a farmer can utilize the state-law remedies
provided in the producer's lien statute.6° If, however, the processor be-
comes insolvent and enters federal bankruptcy proceedings, federal law
will determine the rights of a lienholding farmer against the debtor
processor.6
1
Congress has the power to make "uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States."' 62 Federal preemption pre-
cludes a state from determining the priorities among creditors in bank-
ruptcy. 63 Nevertheless, the "underlying property interests and
commercial arrangements" involved in bankruptcy proceedings typically
are created by state law.64 Thus, the states can affect the outcome of
federal bankruptcy cases indirectly by exercising the states' acknowl-
edged power to legislate the structure of the underlying property inter-
ests.65 Statutory liens historically have been a favorite technique of state
58. Id. § 2. (intended to add CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 55654).
59. See supra note 56 & accompanying text.
60. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 55647 (West 1968) (personal actions); id § 55651
(injunction and foreclosure); see supra notes 37-39 & accompanying text.
61. International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929) (federal preemption in
bankruptcy law); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
62. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 4.
63. International Shoe, 278 U.S. at 265; P. MURPHY, CREDrrORS' RIGHTS IN BANK-
RUPTCY § 14.02, at 14-2 (1984).
64. Selby v. Ford Motor Co., 590 F.2d 642, 646 (6th Cir. 1979) (citing Chicago Bd. of
Trade v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1, 10 (1923)).
65. See In re Telemart Enters., Inc., 524 F.2d 761, 763 (9th Cir. 1975). The Bankruptcy
Code favors equality of distribution of a bankrupt's assets among his creditors. Congress, how-
ever, generally recognizes the property interests created by state law. "These two policies are
inherently contradictory, and much of the history of the [Bankruptcy] Act chronicles succes-
sive attempts by Congress to strike a proper balance between the interests involved." Id
efforts to influence bankruptcy law.66 A state can give some creditors
lien rights that are superior to the rights of other creditors,67 as Califor-
nia has done for farmers in the producer's lien.68 The Bankruptcy Code
normally recognizes the secured status of lien creditors. 6
9
Congress, however, has restricted the extent to which state lien
laws70 may disrupt the uniformity of federal bankruptcy administra-
tion.71 Section 545(1) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a trustee in bank-
ruptcy to avoid the claim of a statutory lien on the debtor's property if
the statutory lien first becomes effective upon the initiation of federal
bankruptcy proceedings or other defined insolvency conditions.
72 Al-
lowing the trustee in bankruptcy to defeat statutory liens that create
property rights only in bankruptcy 73 does not invalidate the California
producer's lien. The producer's lien is not defined in terms of the insol-
vency of the nonpaying processor, and the farmer's lien interest is created
66. P. MURPHY, supra note 63, § 14.02.
67. Id.
68. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 55633 (West Supp. 1985); see supra notes 30-32 &
accompanying text.
69. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982); see also S. REP. No. 1159, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted
in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2456, 2456 ("[T]he Bankruptcy Act has traditionally
recognized that a lien is a valid property right which must be satisfied out of the assets to
which it attaches before any part of those assets becomes available for distribution to un-
secured creditors.").
70. See supra note 9 (statutory lien defined and distinguished from consensual liens aris-
ing by contract).
71. See S. REP. No. 1159, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, reprinted'in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2456, 2457 ("[I]f all statutory liens, regardless of what they were in substance,
were to be treated as liens in bankruptcy the order of federally created priorities would be
completely disrupted."); see also S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 86, reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5872 (another purpose of § 545 was to encourage the
free movement of goods in general commerce); COLLIER, supra note 9, § 545.01[3], at 545-6 to
-7. See generally Schneyer, Statutory Liens Under the New Bankruptcy Code-Some Problems
Remain, 55 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 1-7 (1981) (brief history of Congressional limitations on statu-
tory liens).
72. 11 U.S.C. § 545(1) (1982), as amended by Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, § 460, 98 Stat. 333, 377 (1984) provides:
The trustee may avoid the fixing of a statutory lien on property of the debtor to the
extent that such lien-
(1) first becomes effective against the debtor-
(A) when a case under this title concerning the debtor is commenced;
(B) when an insolvency proceeding other than under this title concerning
the debtor is commenced;
(C) when a custodian is appointed or takes possession;
(D) when the debtor becomes insolvent;
(E) when the debtor's financial condition fails to meet a specified stan-
dard; or
(F) at the time of an execution against property of the debtor levied at
the instance of an entity other than the holder of such statutory lien
73. Id. In other words, it must be possible to permit enforcement of the lien without the
debtor's insolvency.
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at the moment of delivery of the farm products,74 inevitably in advance
of payment problems.
Section 545(2) allows the trustee in bankruptcy to defeat statutory
liens if the lien "is not perfected or enforceable at the time of the com-
mencement of the case [in bankruptcy] against a bona fide purchaser that
purchases such property at the time of the commencement of the case,
whether or not such a purchaser exists."' 75 Thus, the Code invalidates
liens that would not be enforceable against a bona fide purchaser, real or
hypothetical, 76 of the liened goods.77 The bona fide purchaser test, how-
ever, has given the federal courts considerable difficulty in application.
Although the state property law determines the rights of a bona fide pur-
chaser under section 545(2),78 in some instances the state has no clear
standard for the rights of a bona fide purchaser under a particular lien
statute.7
9
Moreover, section 545(2) reveals no congressional awareness that
the rights of a bona fide purchaser can vary in different circumstances. 0
Yet in Louisiana the rights of a bona fide purchaser of personal property
74. CAL. FOOD & AGRiC. CODE §§ 55632, 55635 (West 1968 & Supp. 1985).
75. 11. U.S.C. § 545(2) (1982), as amended by Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, § 460, 98 Stat. 333, 377. The 1984 amendments substituted the phrase "at the
time of the commencement of the case" for "on the date of the filing of the petition." This
change should not affect the present analysis.
The key terms "perfected" and "bona fide purchaser" are not defined in the Bankruptcy
Code. See supra notes 27-28 for the usual definition of "perfected," and the related term "at-
tachment." The term "perfected" was used in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 to mean "a security
interest which is perfected is good against the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy." I G. GILMORE,
supra note 29, at 435. Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code makes extensive use of the
term, which "does not appear in any of the older security statutes." Id. However, the term
was already used without apparent need for explanation in I L. JONES, THE LAW OF LIENS
§ 106, at 99 (3d ed. 1914).
The term "bona fide purchaser" is defined by applicable local law: "The rights of a bona
fide purchaser and how a statutory lien is perfected, or whether such a lien can be perfected
against such a purchaser, are matters left for determination to state or federal lien law." 4
COLLIER, supra note 9, § 545.04[2], at 545-19. In California, "[a] bona fide purchaser is one
who has purchased property for value without notice of any defects in the title of the seller."
Walters v. Calderon, 25 Cal. App. 3d 863, 876, 102 Cal. Rptr. 89, 97 (1972); accord Hansen v.
G & G Trucking Co., 236 Cal. App. 2d 481, 498, 46 Cal. Rptr. 186, 197 (1965).
76. 11 U.S.C. § 545(2) (1982).
77. S. REP. No. 1159, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. &AD.
NEWS 2456, 2461 ("The holders of such Hens have reason to know that their security [interest
in the subject property] is extremely vulnerable.").
78. Holt v. Crucible Steel Co., 224 U.S. 262 (1912); In re Leach, 15 Bankr. 1005, 1009
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1981); 4 COLLIER, supra note 9, § 545.04[2], at 545-19.
79. See Ex Parte Application of Trustee for Order Extending Time in Which to File
Applicant's Opening Brief at 3, In re T.H. Richards Processing Co., No. 84-0835 (E.D. Cal
filed July 9, 1984) (no prior reported cases testing the producer's lien).
80. Schneyer, supra note 71, at 33.
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vary depending on whether the purchaser has or has not taken delivery.a'
In New York, the enforceability of an unfiled mechanic's lien against a
bona fide purchaser of real property depends on the language of the
conveyance.
82
Lacking state guidance for determining the rights of a bona fide pur-
chaser, federal courts have articulated standards for applying the bona
fide purchaser test for statutory lien validity. Unfortunately, courts have
employed various and sometimes inconsistent standards for the test.a
3
The following section evaluates the bona fide purchaser test standards
employed in the federal decisions.
Federal Court Interpretations of the Bona Fide Purchaser Test
Some federal courts have held that a state statutory lien meets the
bona fide purchaser test if the lienholder has complied with all the re-
quirements of the relevant state statute.8 4 These requirements vary
markedly from statute to statute. In In re Allgeier & Dyer, Inc.,S5 the
bankruptcy court upheld Kentucky mechanics' liens for work done on
public improvement projects because the lienholders had met the statu-
tory notice and filing requirements for the liens.86 In contrast, the bank-
ruptcy court in Michigan upheld city personal property tax liens in In re
Cambron Corp.8 7 although the only statutory requirement for their
perfection was the passing of the date on which the taxes became due.A5
Courts taking this "statutory requirements" approach do not evalu-
ate the adequacy of the state's statutory provisions in light of congres-
sional intent. Congress enacted the bona fide purchaser requirement to
limit, rather than confirm, the states' power to regulate property relation-
ships.8 9 Yet a bona fide purchaser test that simply reflects the state re-
quirements places no restriction on state power to regulate this aspect of
the property relationship. Thus, although the statutory requirements ap-
81. In re Trahan, 283 F. Supp. 620, 626 (W.D. La.), aff'd per curiam, 402 F.2d 796 (5th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969).
82. In re Chesterfield Developers, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 689, 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
83. Compare In re Cambron Corp., 27 Bankr. 723 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983) (statutory
requirements of the local lien law were met and notice was not treated as an issue; lien upheld)
with In re Mission Marine Assocs., 633 F.2d 678, 681 (3d Cir. 1980) (statutory requirements of
local lien law were met, but lien provided no notice to subsequent purchasers; lien held
invalid).
84. In re Cambron Corp., 27 Bankr. 723, 726 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983); In re Allgeier &
Dyer, Inc., 18 Bankr. 82, 87 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982) ("Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1978
• . . as a general rule, statutory liens survive the filing of a petition under the Code so long as
statutory requirements have been strictly complied with.").
85. 18 Bankr. 82 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982).
86. Id. at 84-86, 88.
87. 27 Bankr. 723 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983).
88. Id. at 726.
89. See supra note 71 & accompanying text.
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proach is an easy standard to apply, it inadequately enforces the congres-
sional intent underlying the bona fide purchaser test.
Other federal courts look to the face of the statute creating the par-
ticular lien for an answer. Under this version of the bona fide purchaser
test, the lien is considered valid if the statute expressly provides that a
perfected lien is enforceable against a bona fide purchaser.90 In In re
Cummins,91 a California county had properly filed liens for delinquent
personal property taxes against a debtor. The statute provided that real
property liens could be perfected by filing alone. 92 The liens in Cum-
mins, however, concerned personal property and were effective only
against a purchaser with actual notice of the liens.93 The court con-
cluded: "Because the lien is expressly made invalid against a [bona fide
purchaser of the personal property of the debtor], it is also invalid against
the trustee" in bankruptcy.
94
The "express language" approach inadequately enforces congres-
sional intent by essentially allowing a state to circumvent the force of the
bona fide purchaser test. If the bankruptcy court does not ask whether
the state lien may be fairly enforced against innocent purchasers, then
the test becomes purely formal and is easily overcome by state draftsmen.
The express language approach, however, is more restrictive than the
statutory requirements approach. States may be reluctant to enact the
express language making a perfected lien enforceable against bona fide
purchasers because it could burden state commerce. 95
A third position taken by the federal courts is that the particular
lien survives the bona fide purchaser test if under state law the lien could
be enforced against any one of several types96 of bona fide purchasers. 97
90. In re Cummins, 656 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1981); In re J.R. Nieves & Co., 446
F.2d 188, 194 (1st Cir. 1971) ("Since the [particular state lien] by its own terms does not
provide protection against bona fide purchasers,. . . it is not valid against the trustee."); In re
Tropicana Graphics, Inc., 24 Bankr. 381, 383 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1982) ("This court has been
unable to find any statute of the State of California which renders [the particular] lien enforce-
able against a bona fide purchaser. . . ."); In re Leach, 15 Bankr. 1005, 1009-10 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 1981) (the legislature could have made the lien valid against a bona fide purchaser "with
the use of appropriate statutory language"); In re Hughes, 9 Bankr. 251, 257 (Bankr. W.D. La.
1981) (state lien "provisions do not in their own terms provide protection against bona fide
purchasers").
91. 656 F.2d 1262, 1264 (9th Cir. 1981).
92. Id. at 1265.
93. Id. at 1264-65.
94. Id. at 1265.
95. P. MURPHY, supra note 63, § 14.02, at 14-2 (If a given statutory lien were too gener-
ally enforceable, that "would severely inhibit the ability of the party on whom it has been
imposed to transact business.").
96. See supra notes 80-82 & accompanying text.
97. In re Chesterfield Developers, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 689, 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); P. MUR-
PHY, supra note 63, § 14.02, at 14-3 n.5 (a statutory "lien need only be good as against one type
of bona fide purchaser, not all" (emphasis in original)).
In re Chesterfield Developers, Inc. 98 concerned a New York statute that
allowed filing of a mechanic's lien up to four months after the work was
performed. 99 In the interim, the effect of the lien on subsequent pur-
chasers depended upon whether or not language acknowledging the pos-
sibility of unfiled liens on the property was included in the conveyance.100
The bankruptcy court concluded that this created "two types of bona fide
purchasers."' 101 The court declared that it would be unjust to say that
the "trustee [in bankruptcy] is considered to be any kind of bona fide
purchaser that local law would make superior to the statutory lienor."'' 02
The court apparently would invalidate the lien only if it were unenforce-
able against both types of bona fide purchasers in the New York lien law.
This third position illustrates the inherent ambiguity of the bona fide
purchaser test. If a court finds that a state lien law conceives of more
than one type of bona fide purchaser, the court must decide which type
of bona fide purchaser the trustee in bankruptcy is. Yet that determina-
tion is made in a factual vacuum because the trustee is only a hypotheti-
cal purchaser. Under the "any one type" approach, the trustee is viewed
as a bona fide purchaser with the least priority available under state law.
The approach therefore does not lead to vigorous enforcement of the
bona fide purchaser test.
A fourth position is that the lien is valid under the bona fide pur-
chaser test if the lien would be enforceable against a bona fide purchaser
in the factual circumstances of the actual bankruptcy case.10 3 In In re
Trahan,'°4 Louisiana gave the seller of goods a lien for the purchase
price, without any filing requirement, so long as the goods remained in
the possession of the first purchaser.105 Resale of the goods by the pur-
chaser defeated the lien only if the second purchaser took possession of
the goods. 106 The court, stressing the significance of "the reality of the
situation between the parties,"' 0 7 refused to speculate as to the effect of
98. 285 F. Supp. 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
99. Id. at 690-91.
100. Id. at 691.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. In re Trahan, 283 F. Supp. 620, 626 & n.9 (W.D. La.), affdper curiam, 402 F.2d 796
(5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969). The Trahan position continues to be fol-
lowed in the Fifth Circuit. See, e.g., In re Tape City, U.S.A., Inc., 677 F.2d 401 (5th Cir.
1982).
104. 283 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. La.), af'd per curiam, 402 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969). The lien in Trahan is called a vendor's privilege in the civil law
tradition. Id. at 623. The court, however, had no difficulty classifying this security device as a
statutory lien, because it imposed obligations on the debtor by operation of law. Id.
105. Id. at 626.
106. Id. The court conceded that possession did not necessarily depend on physical move-
ment of the goods, but rather on control over the goods. Id. at 626 n.8.
107. Id. at 626.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [V/ol. 36
March 1985] CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURAL PRODUCER'S LIEN 621
other hypothetical situations involving the trustee in bankruptcy. 108 The
court emphasized the important position of this seller's lien in Louisiana
law: "[It] is one of the most important and highest ranking security de-
vices recognized in Louisiana. It has formed a cornerstone for credit in
the economic structure of the mercantile trade in this State for centu-
ries."10 9 In Trahan, the debtor still had possession of the liened goods. 110
Therefore, the court held that the lien was valid against the trustee in
bankruptcy. 1
1
This fourth position evades the problem of the hypothetical nature
of the trustee's status as a bona fide purchaser. Because the trustee is not
a real purchaser, the trustee probably will never take the additional steps,
such as transporting the goods, that a real purchaser routinely would.
112
Therefore, a bankruptcy court following this "factual circumstances" ap-
proach frustrates congressional intent because it rarely invalidates state
statutory liens. By disregarding the hypothetical bona fide purchaser sta-
tus of the trustee, the bankruptcy court fails to recognize that the bank-
ruptcy bona fide purchaser test has purposes independent of the
underlying state property law. State property law is merely a vehicle for
bankruptcy law in this instance.
Under a fifth view, some courts uphold the lien only if the state
statute requires actual or constructive notice to a bona fide purchaser via
recording, seizure of the goods, or equivalent means.1 13 In In re Mission
Marine Associates,114 New Jersey law provided a mechanic's lien for
work done on marine vessels prior to launching, but did not require re-
cording of the lien.1 5 The Third Circuit discerned a state "policy con-
cerning the protection of bona fide purchasers against secret non-
possessory liens .... ,116 The Third Circuit was "confident the
108. Id. at 626 n.9.
109. Id. at 627 (court was therefore disinclined to view the lien as a state attempt to dis-
rupt federal bankruptcy law).
110. Id. at 621, 626 n.9.
111. Id. at 626-28.
112. Comment, Statutory Liens under Section 67c of the Bankruptcy Act: Some Problems
of Definition, 43 TULANE L. REv. 305, 324 (1969). Section 67c was the predecessor of 11
U.S.C. § 545.
113. In re Cummins, 656 F.2d 1262, 1264-65 (9th Cir. 1981) (quotes with approval In re
J.R. Nieves & Co., 446 F.2d 188, 193-94 (lst Cir. 1971)); In re Mission Marine Assocs., 633
F.2d 678, 681 (3d Cir. 1980); Nieves, 446 F.2d at 193-94 (court declared in dictum that "those
state liens [should be valid] in which the laws creating them provide specifically for perfection
against bona fide purchasers by recording, seizure, or other means of actual or constructive
notice"); In re Leach, 15 Bankr. 1005, 1010 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981) ("the State would have no
recourse against the third party who gave fair consideration without notice of the State's
lien").
114. 633 F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 1980).
115. Id. at 679-80.
116. Id. at 681. This policy was evident in an earlier New Jersey case, Lanterman v. Luby,
96 N.J.L. 255, 114 A. 325 (1921), concerning a different lien: "Secret liens upon chattels are
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Supreme Court of New Jersey would apply the. . . policy to protect a
[buyer] who purchased from Mission Marine without notice of [the cred-
itor's] claim .... ,117 Thus, the court viewed notice as the core require-
ment of the bona fide purchaser test.
1 8
This "notice" approach ensures the most sensible enforcement of
congressional intent for the bona fide purchaser test. A statutory lien
that includes notice filing manifests to the world the lienholder's interest
in the goods. 119  Therefore, such a lien is not "tenuous," 120  and
lienholders should confidently expect enforcement of the lien even
against subsequent purchasers. 12 1 Bankruptcy courts can easily apply a
"notice" standard by examining the provisions of particular statutory
liens. The courts can distinguish between the validity of the lien statute
(whether it provides notice provisions or not) and the validity of a partic-
ular creditor's lien (whether properly filed or not), thus providing clearer
guidance to creditors generally in that state.
This "notice" approach raises the possibility of a fourteenth amend-
ment due process challenge to other approaches that do not require no-
tice filing provisions. The highest court in New Jersey long ago raised
this as a possibility. 1 22 More recently, the United States Supreme Court
has affirmed that federal bankruptcy power is subject to the fifth amend-
ment's prohibition against taking private property without compensa-
tion.123 Whether a bankruptcy court's enforcement of a state statutory
lien against a purchaser without notice violates due process under either
the fourteenth amendment or the fifth amendment, however, has not
been expressly considered by the federal courts. This question seems es-
pecially difficult when the bona fide purchaser can be merely hypotheti-
an obstruction and a menace to trade and as such are against the policy of the law." Id. at 259,
114 A. at 326.
117. Mission Marine, 633 F.2d at 681.
118. Id.
119. A respected commentator points out that "older chattel mortgage acts . . . pro-
ceeded on the assumption that a properly filed mortgage was 'good against the world.' Never-
theless, even under such chattel mortgage acts [providing notice via recording] the courts
regularly . . . protected the buyer and held against the mortgagee." 2 G. GILMORE, supra
note 29, § 26.1, at 679.
120. See supra note 77 & accompanying text.
121. See supra note 77 & accompanying text.
122. Lanterman, 96 N.J.L. at 259, 114 A. at 332.
Whether, in case the [state statutory lien] had expressly included subsequent inno-
cent purchasers for value without notice within those against whom the right of
seizure. . . exist[s] . . . , the [statute] would be unconstitutional as a deprivation of
property without due process of law, contrary to the inhibition of the fourteenth
amendment ... we do not. . . decide.
Id.
123. United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 74 (1982). The facts of the case,
however, made it unnecessary to decide the fifth amendment issue. Id.
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cal.124 The due process issue, however, could make the "notice"
approach to the bona fide purchaser test of the bankruptcy law the only
constitutional approach.
Because of its inherent advantages, the "notice" approach should be
uniformly adopted by the bankruptcy courts. The "notice" approach
best enforces the congressional intent underlying the bona fide purchaser
test. Under this approach, the states are properly limited in their use of
statutory liens. If the states want to give certain groups of creditors se-
cured status, then they may give these creditors lien rights that are evi-
denced in general commerce by a notice filing. Furthermore, bankruptcy
courts can readily administer the "notice" approach. This approach
reduces the ambiguity created by the hypothetical bona fide purchaser
status of the trustee in bankruptcy. The courts more easily can deter-
mine if this hypothetical entity could have had notice of a particular lien
than they can determine what type of purchaser he is or what actions
beyond purchase he may or may not be supposed to have taken.
The California Producer's Lien and the Federal Bona Fide
Purchaser Test
This section of the Note evaluates the efficacy of the California pro-
ducer's lien in federal bankruptcy proceedings under each of the federal
court approaches described in the preceding section. The analysis of the
application of the federal standards to the producer's lien draws on the
details of a recent California bankruptcy case for illustrative material.
The illustrative case, In re T.H. Richards Processing Co., 125 con-
cerned the insolvency of a major California cannery in 1982. Several
tomato and pear farmers claimed producer's lien rights against the
processed farm products inventory of the insolvent processor. 126 During
lengthy proceedings to settle the debtor-company's affairs, the farmer-
creditors moved for an order to determine the validity of the producer's
lien. 127 On June 18, 1984, the bankruptcy court issued the requested or-
der, declaring: "The producer's lien . . . is a valid state statutory lien
• . .not subject to avoidance by the trustee under 11 U.S.C. 545(2)."128
The order was not accompanied by an opinion.
124. 11 U.S.C. § 545(2) (1982) ("whether or not such a purchaser exists"); see also In re
Frosty Morn Meats, Inc., 7 Bankr. 988, 1004 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980) ("Although the bank-
ruptcy power of Congress is not without limitation, these limitations have never been fully and
precisely defined, and, in fact, are probably incapable of definition.").
125. No. 282-2614-W-7 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. filed July 9, 1982).
126. Application of Trustee for Leave to Appeal at 2, In re T.H. Richards Processing Co.,
No. 282-2614-W-7 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. filed July 9, 1982).
127. Id. at 4.
128. In re T.H. Richards Processing Co., No. 282-2614-W-7 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. June 18,
1984) (Order Determining Validity of Statutory Liens).
T.H. Richards Processing Co. was a large cannery with an inventory
worth just over $15 million. 129 Richards owed three large banks just
under $15 million on lines of credit secured by canned goods inventory,
as well as accounts receivable. 130 The banks had required Richards to
place some canned goods inventory in a field warehouse maintained by a
third party and to issue warehouse receipts to the banks. 131 Field ware-
housing has been a traditional method of providing collateral for secured
financing in the canning industry. 132
[A] canner will often process his entire year's product during the few
weeks after harvest; the stock is gradually sold off during the year until
the cycle begins again. As the goods are sold, they are released from
the warehouse and the proceeds devoted to a proportionate reduction
of the bank loan.'
33
Inventory control in the field warehouse may actually be lax, however,
because the warehouse company often hires one of the canning com-
pany's employees on a temporary basis to staff the field warehouse. 134 In
Richards, the banks conceded that they did not know precisely what in-
ventory Richards had sold or transferred. 135
Richards' inventory also contained several million dollars worth of
canned goods held on behalf of "bill and hold" customers. 136 As a rou-
tine business practice, bill and hold customers purchased canned goods
from Richards, but requested that Richards delay delivery of the goods
until a later date. 137 The bill and hold purchasers included such well-
known processed food marketing companies as Castle & Cooke, Libby,
and Lawry's.138 Lawry's contract with Richards provided that
"[i]dentification of the Product to the contract shall occur when RICH-
ARDS places the finished Product in its storage facilities." 139 Moreover,
risk of loss was to pass to Lawry's "as soon as the finished Product is
129. Debtor's Statement of Affairs, In re T.H. Richards Processing Co., No. 282-2614-W-
7 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. filed July 9, 1982).
130. Id. at Attachment L.
131. Id. at Attachment E; Banks' Pretrial Statement at 5, In re T.H. Richards Processing
Co., No. 282-2614-W-7 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. filed July 9, 1982).
132. 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 29, § 16.2, at 147-54.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Bank's Supplemental Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories at 7, Hunt-
Wesson Foods, Inc. v. T.H. Richards Processing Co., No. 282-1487 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Mar.
21, 1984). The case is an action by a bill and hold customer for recovery of its goods from
Richards' inventory.
136. Debtor's Statement of Affairs, Attachment DI, In re T.H. Richards Processing Co.,
No. 282-2614-W-7 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. filed July 9, 1982).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Response of Defendant Lawry's Foods, Inc. to Bank's First Set of Interrogatories at
Exhibit A, In re T.H. Richards Processing Co., No. 282-2614-W-7 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. filed July
9, 1982).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 36
March 1985] CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURAL PRODUCER'S LIEN 625
placed in RICHARDS storage facilities." 140 Lawry Foods maintained
that goods sold to, but held for, it were distinctly identifiable within
Richards' inventory "because all Lawry's product was produced espe-
cially for Lawry's according to formulas belonging to Lawry's and were
placed in bottles of a unique shape and size bearing Lawry's labels."
1 41
Richards also owed forty-three farmers or farming operations a total
of $3.5 million in payments on contracts for purchase of farm products in
the previous year's harvest. 142 The average farmer's claim was
$83,500.143 Among these farmer claimants, thirty-two claimed secured
status against Richards because of the producer's lien.
144
The Validity of the Producer's Lien in Federal Bankruptcy Proceedings
The California producer's lien does not first become effective upon
the debtor's bankruptcy 145 and therefore is not invalidated by section
545(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.146 The lien's effectiveness against the
debtor is defined in terms of the delivery dates of the farm products to
the processing company,147 rather than by criteria relating to the proces-
sor's solvency or involvement in bankruptcy proceedings.
The crucial issue in determining the validity of the producer's lien in
federal bankruptcy proceedings is the enforceability of the lien against a
bona fide purchaser, the test specified in section 545(2).148 To resolve
this issue, the lien provisions must be examined against each of the five
federal court approaches to the bona fide purchaser test.
149
Under the statutory requirements approach, a state statutory lien is
valid in bankruptcy if the lienholder has complied with all the require-
ments of the lien statute.150 A bankruptcy court taking this approach
should uphold the California producer's lien. The California lien statute
only requires that the farmer has delivered his products to a processing
140. Id
141. Id at 12-13.
142. Debtor's Statement of Affairs at Attachment M-3, In re T.H. Richards Processing
Co., No. 282-2614-W-7 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. filed July 9, 1982).
143. Id
144. Application of Trustee for Leave to Appeal at 2-4, In re T.H. Richards Processing
Co., No. 282-2614-W-7 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. filed July 9, 1982).
145. CAL. FOOD & AGPIC. CODE § 55632 (West 1968). These provisions are discussed
supra notes 27-28 & accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 72-73 & accompanying text.
147. CAL. FooD & AGRic. CODE §§ 55632, 55635 (West 1968 & Supp. 1985).
148. The lien can be avoided by the trustee if it "is not perfected or enforceable at the time
of the commencement of the case [in bankruptcy] against a bona fide purchaser that purchases
such property at the time of the commencement of the case, whether or not such a purchaser
exists." 11 U.S.C. § 545(2) (1982), as amended by Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, § 460(3), 98 Stat. 333, 377.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 84-124.
150. See supra notes 84-89 & accompanying text.
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company' 5 and that he has deferred receipt of payment for his prod-
ucts.' 52 Farmer-creditors of an insolvent processor have routinely com-
plied with the statutory requirements. In Richards, once the plaintiff
farmer had delivered produce to the processor on contract without re-
ceiving payment in full, the farmer had done all that the statute requires
to benefit from the lien.
Under the express language approach, a state statutory lien is valid
in bankruptcy when the statute expressly provides for enforceability
against a bona fide purchaser. 153 A bankruptcy court taking this ap-
proach is likely to invalidate the producer's lien. The California lien stat-
ute makes no reference to bona fide purchasers or to related categories,
such as buyers in ordinary course of business. Although the statute pro-
vides that the producer's lien is "a preferred lien prior in dignity to all
other liens, claims, or encumbrances,"' 154 a bona fide purchaser is neither
a lienholder'"5 nor an encumbrancer.156 The possibility that a bona fide
purchaser is a claimant was dismissed by the court in In re Leach,157
which concluded that a "bona fide purchaser does not have a claim
against the debtor."' 58  The purchaser has an ownership interest in the
goods, rather than a claim. 159 Indeed, the phrase "other liens, claims, or
encumbrances" is reasonably interpreted to denote other examples of the
category, security interests of creditors, to which the producer's lien be-
longs. 60 Therefore, the statute has not expressly made the lien enforcea-
ble against bona fide purchasers.
This analysis of the lien statute is supported by comparing its lan-
guage with that of another California agricultural lien, the lien on live-
stock.' 61 In the livestock lien statute, the California Legislature
expressly provided that the lien on livestock sold to a meat packer sur-
vives resale of the livestock by the packer, except that a buyer in ordinary
course of business 62 takes free of such a lien even if he knows the lien
151. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 55632 (West 1968).
152. Id. § 55631.
153. See supra notes 90-95 & accompanying text.
154. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 55633 (West Supp. 1985); see supra notes 30, 68 &
accompanying text.
155. A lien is a "charge or security or encumbrance upon property." BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 832 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
156. An encumbrance is an interest in land, such as a mortgage, lease, lien, or easement.
Id. at 473.
157. 15 Bankr. 1005 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981).
158. Id. at 1009.
159. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 997 (rev. 5th ed. 1979) (ownership is "complete do-
minion, title").
160. See Pasadena Univ. v. County of Los Angeles, 190 Cal. 786, 790, 214 P. 868, 869-70
(1923).
161. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 55702 (West Supp. 1985) (gives livestock producers a
lien on livestock sold to meat packers to secure payment of the purchase price).
162. CAL. COM. CODE § 1201(9) (West Supp. 1985) (defines buyer in ordinary course of
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exists. 163 Obviously, the legislature can expressly specify the impact of a
statutory lien on subsequent purchasers when impact is intended. Thus,
the absence of express language in the producer's lien statute making the
lien enforceable against subsequent purchasers implies that the legisla-
ture intended no such result.
Under the "any one type" approach, which upholds a state statutory
lien in bankruptcy if the bona fide purchaser test is met as to any one
type of bona fide purchaser, 164 the validity of the producer's lien is un-
clear. The lien statute is silent on the subject of bona fide purchasers, and
therefore creates no distinctions among types of bona fide purchasers.
There are no reported California cases construing the impact of the pro-
ducer's lien on various types of bona fide purchasers.
Similarly, article 2 of the Commercial Code, which is the California
law concerned with the rights of purchasers of goods,165 provides no
clear basis for distinguishing among types of bona fide purchasers. The
Commercial Code does not place great weight on delivery of the goods; a
purchaser may leave goods in the hands of a seller for a commercially
reasonable time without impairing the purchaser's rights. 166 Thus, in
Richards, the bill and hold purchasers 167 of canned goods from inventory
would not be viewed as a type of bona fide purchaser significantly differ-
ent from others who purchased and took delivery of canned goods.
Moreover, the distinction under the producer's lien statute between
legal and illegal sales by a processor does not create two types of bona
fide purchasers under the Commercial Code. Under the California Com-
mercial Code, the possible illegality of a sale of processed farm products
by the processor does not affect the rights of the bona fide purchaser.
Under the producer's lien statute, a processor is obligated to retain liened
processed farm products in his control, unless he sells them and devotes
all the proceeds to the satisfaction of lien claims. 168 But the Commercial
Code gives the bona fide purchaser good title even if the seller is in viola-
tion of his legal obligation. 169 Thus, lacking a basis for distinguishing
types of bona fide purchasers of farm products, a bankruptcy court faced
business as a purchaser who in good faith and without notice buys goods "in [the] ordinary
course of business from a person in the business of selling goods of that kind").
163. CAL. FOOD & AGRiC. CODE § 55702(b) (West Supp. 1985) (thus contradicting the
"without notice" element of the definition, supra note 162).
164. See supra notes 96-102 & accompanying text.
165. CAL. COM. CODE § 2102 (West 1964) (article 2 of the Commercial Code governs
sales of goods).
166. Id. § 2402.
167. See supra notes 136-41 & accompanying text.
168. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 55638 (West Supp. 1985).
169. CAL. COM. CODE § 2403(1) (West 1964) (provides in part that "[a] person with void-
able title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value"). The Official
Comment to Uniform Commercial Code § 2-403 adds: "The many particular situations in
which a buyer in ordinary course of business from a dealer has been protected against reserva-
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with the producer's lien probably would adopt a version of the bona fide
purchaser test other than the "any one type" approach.
Under the factual circumstances approach, a state statutory lien is
valid in bankruptcy if it could be enforced against a bona fide purchaser
in the factual circumstances of a particular case.170 The fate of the pro-
ducer's lien in a bankruptcy court adhering to this view is unclear. The
California producer's lien statute does not define the steps a bona fide
purchaser must take to defeat the lien. 171 In Richards, probably there
were bona fide purchasers who had taken delivery of canned goods.
172
The bill and hold customers of Richards had not taken possession of the
canned goods they purchased, but possession has no significance under
the California Commercial Code. 173 None of these purchasers of canned
goods had notice of the producer's liens on Richards' inventory. A bank-
ruptcy court lacking factual circumstances supporting different rights for
different bona fide purchasers probably would apply one of the other,
more general approaches, rather than the factual circumstances
approach.
Under the notice approach, a state statutory lien is valid if subse-
quent purchasers have actual or constructive notice of the lien. 174 The
California producer's lien should be invalidated by a bankruptcy court
taking this approach. The lien statute does not contain any notice or fil-
ing provisions. 175 Moreover, in real property cases, the California courts
have supported the notice approach, stating that "the policy of the law is
against upholding secret liens and charges to the injury of innocent sub-
sequent purchasers .... ,,176 When the legislature has enacted a lien
without provisions requiring recordation, the lien will be enforced "so far
as it can . .. without injury to the rights of bona fide purchasers
.... 17 In addition, the California Supreme Court has enforced the
tion of property or other hidden interest are gathered by [§ 2-403](2)-(4) into a single principle
protecting persons who buy in ordinary course of business out of inventory." Id.
170. See supra notes 103-12 & accompanying text.
171. Contrast this situation with that in In re Trahan, 283 F. Supp. 620, 626-27 (W.D.
La.), affidper curiam, 402 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969), in which
the buyer had not only to purchase, but also to take delivery.
172. See supra note 135 & accompanying text.
173. CAL. COM. CODE § 2402 (West 1964) (purchaser of goods may leave goods in the
possession of the seller "for a commercially reasonable time"). This contrasts with Louisiana
law. See supra note 171. Louisiana has not adopted the Uniform Commercial Code.
174. See supra notes 113-24 & accompanying text.
175. See CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§ 55632, 55635 (West 1968 & Supp. 1985); see also
supra notes 27-29 & accompanying text.
176. Schut v. Doyle, 168 Cal. App. 2d 698, 702, 336 P.2d 567, 569 (1959). Cf Lanterman
v. Luby, 96 N.J.L. 255, 259, 114 A. 325, 326 (1921) (same policy in almost identical language).
177. Finnell v. Finnell, 156 Cal. 589, 594, 105 P. 740, 742 (1909); see also 1 G. GILMORE,
supra note 29, § 14.1, at 439 ("The antagonism to the 'secret lien' runs through our law of sales
and secured transactions alike." (footnote omitted)).
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policy of protecting innocent purchasers in a personal property setting.
178
The Commercial Code also embodies this policy of protecting innocent
purchasers without notice.179
Finally, in the Richards setting, trade purchasers of canned goods
could not know whether the goods they purchased from the processor
were subject to producer's liens of farmers. Thus, upholding these liens
against the actual purchasers of Richards' inventory would seem
unfair.180
Improving the Producer's Lien Statute
The California producer's lien is likely to be valid in federal bank-
ruptcy proceedings under only one of the five standards used by the fed-
eral courts for the bona fide purchaser test of section 545(2).181 The
producer's lien is likely to be invalid under two standards, and the result
is unclear under two standards. 182 Several options are available to the
California Legislature to remedy the vulnerability of the producer's lien
in federal bankruptcy proceedings.
First, the lien statute could be amended to provide expressly for en-
forceability against bona fide purchasers. A number of federal bank-
ruptcy courts apparently would feel bound to give effect to reasonably
explicit language in the statute.
183
A better improvement would be to add a recording requirement to
the lien statute. The filing requirements need not be onerous,18 4 and Cal-
ifornia farmers, who can organize into marketing associations, 185 surely
could comply with them. Moreover, a producer's lien properly filed with
the Secretary of State' 86 probably would be enforced by federal courts
under all of the standards discussed above. Four of the five standards are
178. California Cured Fruit Ass'n v. Stelling, 141 Cal. 713, 719, 75 P. 320, 321 (1904).
179. See supra note 169.
180. Moreover, amendment to make the producer's lien expressly effective against subse-
quent purchasers without notice might violate due process of law. See supra notes 122-24 &
accompanying text. Amendment of the lien statute to provide for notice and filing procedures
might be the only way to make the lien valid in bankruptcy.
181. 11 U.S.C. § 545(2) (1982).
182. Cf Application of Trustee for Leave to Appeal at 5, In re T.H. Richards Processing
Co., No. 282-2614-W-7 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. filed July 9, 1982).
183. See supra notes 90-95 & accompanying text. The courts have not said what language
would suffice.
184. See CAL. COM. CODE § 9402(1) (West Supp. 1985) (specifies the simple details of the
credit arrangement that must appear in a financing statement under the Uniform Commercial
Code).
185. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 54402 (West 1968) (state policy supports the organiza-
tion of farmers into cooperative bargaining associations).
186. See CAL. COM. CODE § 9401(1)(c) (West Supp. 1985) (provides that financing state-
ments under the Uniform Commercial Code must be filed in the Office of the Secretary of
State).
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relevant mainly when a lien statute fails to provide for notice to subse-
quent purchasers. These four standards allow enforcement of a lien
against a purchaser, and the trustee in bankruptcy as a hypothetical pur-
chaser without notice, whenever the statutory requirements are met,
187
when statutory language expressly condones that result,188 when the fac-
tual circumstances require the innocent purchaser to have done some-
thing more to protect his rights, 1 8 9 or when the state law distinguishes his
rights from those of innocent purchasers generally.190 A recording provi-
sion should obviate all these concerns, making a lien easily enforceable
against a subsequent purchaser with notice.
The producer's lien also could be made unwaivable by the farmers,
thus protecting them against processors with superior bargaining
power. 191 Artisans receive such protection under California's mechanic's
lien statute. 192
Nevertheless, legal improvements in the producer's lien do not con-
clude the analysis. A crucial issue is whether an enforceable producer's
lien truly would be desirable for California farmers. Although farmers
who directly experience the insolvency of a processor would benefit from
a lien valid in bankruptcy, 193 legal improvements in the producer's lien
may not be desirable for California farmers generally.
The banking community presses the view that an enforceable pro-
187. See supra notes 84-89 & accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 90-95 & accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 103-12 & accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 96-102 & accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 44-55 & accompanying text. Making the lien unwaivable, without
simultaneously improving its enforceability in bankruptcy, would leave farmers the most vul-
nerable. 11 U.S.C. § 551 (1982) provides: "Any transfer avoided under [several sections in-
eluding] 545 . . . of this title . . . is preserved for the benefit of the estate." The legislative
history indicates that section 551 "prevents junior lienors from improving their position at the
expense of the estate [in bankruptcy] when a senior lien is avoided" by the trustee. S. REP.
No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 91, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787,
5877. Thus, an unenforceable yet unwaived producer's lien would fail to make the farmer a
secured creditor and nonetheless would interfere with the secured bank lender's interest in the
canner's inventory.
192. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3262 (West Supp. 1985) (mechanic's lien rights cannot be waived,
as a matter of public policy); see Bentz Plumbing & Heating v. Favalaro, 128 Cal. App. 3d 145,
180 Cal. Rptr. 223 (1982) (enforcing no-waiver policy of § 3262).
The producer's lien might also be amended to apply to cooperatively owned canneries.
Presently, CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 55461 (West 1968) exempts cooperatives from the
provisions of the Code's chapter on processing companies. Before 1983, California Canners &
Growers, a cooperatively owned cannery which had filed for bankruptcy, had been one of the
50 largest businesses in the Bay Area. Hayden, The Big 50, SAN FRANCISCO Bus., July 1984,
at 16. Exempting processors of this size from the producer's lien may be unnecessarily risky for
farmers.
193. However, there can still be a long wait for the money. The plaintiff farmers in In re
T.H. Richards Processing Co., No. 282-2614-W-7 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. filed July 9, 1982) have
not yet received what they are owed after more than two years.
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ducer's lien on processor inventories would make financing of processing
companies less attractive economically for banks.194 If this is true, or if
the banks react as if it were true, then processors would have to pay more
to obtain financing. Because market adversities may make it difficult for
processors to pass financing costs to customers, 195 the additional cost of
doing business presumably would be borne by the farmers in the form of
lower prices offered for farm products. In Richards, if the banks had
raised the interest rates for loans to the processing company by just one
percent, the additional cost per farmer would have averaged more than
$1000.196 Thus, an enforceable producer's lien would not be a cost-free
gift bestowed on the farmers by the Legislature.
Alternative Methods of Protecting Farmers
The possibility that a legally effective producer's lien would entail
economic cost to farmers makes it desirable to consider other potential
means of protection. 197 In the following section, several alternatives are
compared with the producer's lien for cost prior to a bankruptcy, as well
as legal and financial effectiveness after a bankruptcy has occurred. The
analysis reveals viable alternatives that are preferable to improvements in
the producer's lien.
Change Federal Bankruptcy Law
One obvious alternative would be an amendment of the Bankruptcy
Code to meet the needs of farmers. Congress could take at least two
approaches: the Bankruptcy Code could be amended to provide a federal
statutory lien, or to give farmers a priority among other unsecured
creditors.
In 1981, Senator Dole of Kansas proposed legislation giving farmers
a federal statutory lien on the farm products they sell to storage eleva-
tors.198 Senator Dole's bill would have given farmers selling certain
kinds of farm products to a dealer/elevator a lien on the products for
194. Analysis of A.B. 774, supra note 42, at 3; see also Chicago Tribune, Aug. 22, 1982,
§ 5, at 1, col. 1 (a proposed Illinois law in favor of farmer-creditors led bankers to predict a
halt to loans for some grain elevators).
195. See Demand, Inputs Blast Canning Industry, CAL. FARMER, Sept. 3, 1983, at 13
("[P]rices of processed fruits and vegetables have fallen more than prices in any other food
category since 1976.").
196. This figure is calculated from Debtor's Statement of Affairs, In re T.H. Richards
Processing Co., No. 282-2614-W-7 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. filed July 9, 1982).
197. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 6 (1972) ("[S]ociety could obtain
more prevention, at lower cost, using different methods .... [E]fficiency. .. may be an
important factor in shaping public choice.").
198. S. 1365, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., § 7, 127 CONG. REc. S10,228-35 (daily ed. Sept. 22,
1981).
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sixty days from the date of the sale contract. 199 The sixty-day limitation
was a response to concern expressed by banking groups. 200 Although the
bill contained no filing requirements to perfect the lien, Senator Dole
suggested that the banks could protect their interests by "conduct[ing] an
examination of the books of the elevator" for the sixty days prior to ex-
tending a loan to determine what inventory purchased from farmers in
that period was unpaid and thus subject to liens. 201
Senator Dole's bill was passed by the Senate, 20 2 but not by the
House. Even if this federal lien had been enacted, however, and broad-
ened to include sales to processors, it would have faced problems similar
to those presented by California's lien statute. The bona fide purchaser
test of section 545(2) also applies to federal statutory liens, 20 3 thus sub-
jecting such a federal producer's lien to avoidance by trustees in bank-
ruptcy under the case law discussed above. Because Senator Dole's
proposed lien statute contained neither filing requirements for perfection
nor express language making the lien enforceable against subsequent pur-
chasers, it probably would have been invalid in bankruptcy. A federal
lien might be a viable alternative if it included a filing requirement and/
or express enforceability against bona fide purchasers.
A federal lien, however, could increase financing costs for elevators
and processors,204 thus resulting in lower prices offered to farmers. If the
lien had a short duration, such as the one proposed in the Dole legisla-
tion, then the cost would likely be lower than that incurred for the Cali-
fornia lien. 20 5 Thus, the federal lien would not be cost-free to farmers.
Moreover, the sixty-day term for Senator Dole's proposed lien would ex-
pose farmers accepting deferred payment contracts of up to a year, as in
Richards,20 6 to the risk of an insolvency long after the lien had expired.
Although the risk could be ameliorated by a notice filing procedure and a
longer term, the protection would increase the economic cost to farmers,
thus reducing the desirability of the federal lien alternative.
The second approach to amending the Bankruptcy Code is to give
farmers a priority among general unsecured creditors, as is presently
199. Id.
200. 127 CONG. REC. S9831 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1981) (statement of Senator Dole).
201. Id.
202. 127 CONG. REc. S10,233 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1981).
203. 11 U.S.C. § 545(2) (1982) contains no language limiting the bona fide purchaser test
to state statutory liens. 11 U.S.C. § 101(39) (1982) contains no language limiting the definition
of "statutory lien" to the liens created by a state.
204. 127 CONG. REc. 59831 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1981) (statement of Senator Dole, convey-
ing reaction of banking groups to his bill); Looney, Hamilton & Culver, supra note 15, at 570-
71 (noting concern of banking groups over Senator Dole's proposed lien).
205. See supra notes 194-96 & accompanying text (estimating cost of increased financing
passed on to farmers).
206. Tomato Contract, supra note 50.
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done for wage-earners. 207 Such a proposal was included in Senator
Dole's package of relief for farmers.20° The rationale Senator Dole of-
fered was:
The farmer is viewed as a unique producer whose financial security is
threatened by such a bankrupty [of his buyer] in the same manner that
a wage-earner is threatened by the unexpected bankruptcy of his em-
ployer, in that the farmer's main source of income-the cash crop--is
jeopardized. In this respect, the rationale for the priority. . . is analo-
gous to that supporting the priority in favor of wage-earners.
20 9
Such a priority among general unsecured creditors would be helpful to
farmers. Farmers should experience no additional cost because, lacking
an effect on the interests of secured lenders,210 the priority would create
no costs for processors to pass along. If, however, secured interests in
equipment and inventory covered most of a debtor processor's estate in
bankruptcy, a priority among unsecured creditors could still leave farm-
ers largely unpaid.
2 "
Changes in the federal bankruptcy law probably are not the best
solution for farmers. A federal lien that included notice filing require-
ments and an extended duration would entail significant costs to be
passed along by buyers of farm products. A priority for farmers among
unsecured creditors has some value, although the value depends on how
much remains available for unsecured creditors after the secured credi-
tors have been satisfied.
Provide a Statutory Trust
A state-legislated statutory trust impressed on farm products or pro-
ceeds of their sale by a processor could avoid the problem under section
207. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) (1982) (claims for "wages, salaries, or commissions" earned
during the 90 days prior to the bankruptcy, to a maximum of $2000 per person, are satisfied
ahead of other unsecured creditors).
208. S. 1365, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., § 5, 127 CONG. REC. S10233 (daily ed. Sept 22, 1981).
209. 127 CONG. REc. S9832 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1981); see also Joint Indus. Bd. of the Elec.
Indus. v. United States, 391 U.S. 224, 227-28 (1968). The purpose of the priority for wage-
earners was "to enable employees displaced by bankruptcy to secure, with some promptness,
the money directly due to them in back wages, and thus to alleviate in some degree the hard-
ship that unemployment usually brings to workers and their families." Id. at 226-27 (quoting
United States v. Embassy Restaurant, 359 U.S. 29, 32 (1959)).
210. The term "priority" in 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1982) is somewhat misleading-under 11
U.S.C. § 725 (1982), secured creditors have recourse to their collateral before the priorities of
§ 507 come into play. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 382-83 (1977), reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6338-39; 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 29, § 45.2, at
1284; 9A AM. JUR. 2d Bankruptcy § 689 (1980).
211. For example, in In re T.H. Richards Processing Co., No. 282-2614-W-7 (1iankr. E.D.
Cal. filed July 9, 1982), a § 507 priority probably would not have helped the farmers. The
trustee suggested that there was likely to be little left after the secured creditors' claims were
satisfied. Application of Trustee for Leave to Appeal at 5, In re T.H. Richards Processing Co.,
No. 282-2614-W-7 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. fied July 9, 1982).
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545(2).212 Like a lien, such a statutory trust would give the farmer the
equivalent of secured status without any filing or perfection require-
ments.213 Yet the validity of a state-imposed trust in federal bankruptcy
proceedings is unclear.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, invalidated an
attempt in California to impress a statutory trust (applicable to money
order dealers) on the whole of the debtor's commingled assets when the
debtor owed any part of them to a protected creditor.2 14 The court said
that to uphold such a trust, absent a requirement that the creditor be able
to trace the funds into the debtor's possession, "would open the door to
state creation of priorities. . . as 'trusts'. This would tend to thwart or
obstruct the scheme of federal bankruptcy."2 15 The Ninth Circuit thus
emphasized the priority of federal bankruptcy policy over state property
law.
The Sixth Circuit, however, upheld a similar state statutory trust in
the construction industry in Michigan, even as to untraceable commin-
gled funds in the hands of the debtor.216 This court reasoned that a stat-
utory trust is not part of the debtor's estate in bankruptcy because it
belongs to the beneficiary and thus is not subject to the claims of other
creditors. 217 The Sixth Circuit emphasized the acknowledged role of the
states in defining property interests such as trusts .218
Thus, whether California could successfully protect farmers through
a statutory trust on the inventory or proceeds in the hands of a processor
is unresolved. A bankruptcy court stressing federal bankruptcy policy
probably would invalidate a California statutory trust approach as a dis-
guised state priority. A bankruptcy court more deferential to state prop-
erty law would uphold such a trust.
Congress, however, may give farmers a statutory trust that is valid
in bankruptcy and superior to the perfected security interests of lend-
ers.2 19 Congress has provided livestock sellers with a federal statutory
212. See generally Schneyer, supra note 71, at 25-33.
213. Id. at 30.
214. Elliott v. Bumb, 356 F.2d 749 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 829 (1966); see also
Schneyer, supra note 71, at 26-28 (discussing Elliott with approval).
215. Elliott, 356 F.2d at 751.
216. Selby v. Ford Motor Co., 590 F.2d 642, 646-47 (6th Cir. 1979); Schneyer, supra note
71, at 28-30 (criticizing Selby as destructive of congressional intent to combat disguised
priorities).
217. Selby, 590 F.2d at 647; see also In re Frosty Morn Meats, Inc., 7 Bankr. 988, 1006
app. A (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980) (statutory trusts are not part of the debtor's estate in
bankruptcy).
218. Selby, 590 F.2d at 647.
219. Frosty Morn Meats, 7 Bankr. at 1001-04 (relying on Congress' broad powers under
the commerce clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the bankruptcy clause, id. at cl. 4).
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trust under the Packers and Stockyards Act,220 and a bankruptcy court
has upheld the trust in bankruptcy proceedings.221 The court noted that
"[i]n the past Congress has frequently changed the priority rights of
creditors and in so doing has merely exercised its constitutional preroga-
tive to regulate and control bankruptcies. '222
Most recently, Congress has enacted statutory trust protection for
farmers who sell fresh produce to commission merchants, dealers, or bro-
kers.223 Fresh produce and "inventories of food or other products de-
rived" therefrom, as well as proceeds of the sale thereof, are to be held in
trust2 24 for unpaid sellers of the produce.225 The statute expressly states
that the purpose of the legislation is to overcome the effects upon farmers
of lenders' security interests in dealers' inventories of farm produce.226 A
farmer is required to fie notice with the Secretary of Agriculture to pre-
serve the benefit of the statutory trust for more than thirty days.227 In
the situation of a deferred payment contract of sale, however, the thirty-
day period commences only after the payment date specified by the con-
tract has passed. 22
8
Unfortunately for California farmers, the federal Perishable Agri-
cultural Commodities Act defines the term "dealer" to exclude most can-
neries and processing companies. 229 If, however, the Act were
broadened to include coverage of canneries, the protection for farmers
would be strong. Farmers would then take priority over secured lenders
in bankruptcy proceedings, and farmers would face a filing requirement
only when nonpayment was already a reality.
230
Nevertheless, either a federal or state statutory trust plan could
220. 7 U.S.C. § 196(b) (1982) (impresses a statutory trust on livestock sold to meat pack-
ers and on proceeds of packers' resale of the livestock).
221. Frosty Morn Meats, 7 Bankr. at 1001, 1003, 1006 app. A.
222. Id. at 1004 app. A.
223. Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 1930 Amendments, Pub. L. No. 98-273,
98 Stat. 165 (1984) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 499e(c) (Supp. 1984)).
224. This arrangement is described as "a nonsegregated floating trust." H.R. REP. No.
543, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 405, 406.
225. 7 U.S.C. § 499e(c)(2) (Supp. 1984) (as amended).
226. Id. § 499e(c)(1); see also Frosty Morn Meats, 7 Bankr. at 1001 app. A (enforcing
policy of the trust against secured lenders).
227. 7 U.S.C. § 499e(c)(3) (Supp. 1984).
228. Id § 499e(c)(3)(ii); see also H.R. RE,. No. 543, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 405, 410-12. The Secretary of Agriculture has the
authority to regulate what constitutes a reasonable period of time to allow the benefit of this
provision. If the Secretary sets a short trust period, then the statutory trust protection would
be unavailing to farmers selling on longer deferred payment contracts.
229. 7 U.S.C. § 499a(6)(C) (1982) ("No person buying any commodity other than potatoes
for canning and/or processing within the State where grown shall be considered a 'dealer'
.... unless such product is frozen or packed in ice, or consists of cherries in brine. .. ").
230. It is unclear, however, whether the trust would cover a long enough period for some
of the deferred payment contracts used in the canning industry. See supra note 228.
make financing more expensive for processors. Although Congress did
not focus on financing problems, 231 bankers were wary of the new pro-
duce trust plan unless it was limited to a brief period of thirty to forty
days after the sale of the produce.232 Enforcement of such a restriction
would expose farmers who sell to canneries on deferred payment con-
tracts to the risk of an insolvency long after the trust had expired. But
any expansive application of the legislation could entail substantial fi-
nancing costs which would be passed along to farmers.
233
At the state level, a statutory trust method of protecting farmers has
serious disadvantages. The statutory trust might not be legally effective
in bankruptcy because the bankruptcy courts could reject it on policy
grounds.234 Moreover, the state statutory trust method probably would
be costly for farmers who will bear the increases in financing the costs of
their buyers. A federal statutory trust is preferable because it apparently
is valid in bankruptcy and would give farmers priority over secured lend-
ers.235 That priority, however, probably would also impose significant
passed-along financing costs on farmers.
236
Establish a Government Insurance Fund
Another alternative to the California producer's lien is the creation
of a state insurance fund to reimburse farmers for losses in buyer insol-
vencies. 237 California already has such a fund, the Farm Products Trust
Fund.238 The Fund is sustained by an annual fee of $125 per licensed
agricultural dealer or processor.239 The Fund will pay no more than fifty
percent of any farmer's claim and no more than $50,000 in total claims
against any one licensee. 240 Obviously, the Fund is inadequate for insol-
vencies on the scale of Richards, in which farmers' claims against a single
processing company totaled $3.5 million.
241
Other states have established far larger insurance funds, chiefly in a
231. See H.R. REP. No. 543, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 405, 407 (indicating that banks should be able to adapt to the existence of the
trust plan).
232. Id. at 10-11, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 405, 414.
233. See supra notes 194-96 & accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 214-15 & accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 219-22 & accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 194-96 & accompanying text.
237. An insurance fund method does not seek to make farmers secured creditors or the
equivalent.
238. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§ 56701-56733 (West Supp. 1985). This should not be
confused with the statutory trusts discussed in the preceding section.
239. Id. § 56703.
240. Id. § 56708. The limit was increased from $25,000 to $50,000 in 1983. Act of July
28, 1983, 1983 Cal. Legis. Serv. 3367 (West).
241. Debtor's Statement of Affairs, Attachment M-3, In re T.H. Richards Processing Co.,
No. 282-2614-W-7 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. filed July 9, 1982).
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grain context. Oklahoma has a $10 million fund 242 financed by an assess-
ment on grain dealers243 who pay a small fee per bushel of grain
purchased from farmers.244 Assessments are suspended whenever the
fund actually contains $10 million.245 The fund pays as much as 100%
of a farmer's loss in a grain dealer insolvency.246 Claim payments to
farmers, however, are made only "on February 1 following the date of
the claim." 247 Thus, an Oklahoma farmer may have to wait as long as a
year for the payment. Similarly, South Carolina provides for a $6 million
fund, assessing fees based on crop value but guaranteeing payment within
thirty days. 248
In these states, the grain dealer presumably would pass his assess-
ments on to the farmers. The estimated annual cost per average farmer
for maintaining the state funds would be $81 in Oklahoma 249 and $167 in
South Carolina.
250
Illinois' fund was established in 1983.251 This fund will amount to
$3 million when in full operation.25 2 The fund is financed by annual fees
assessed on grain dealers and warehousemen. 253 The assessments are
made according to a complex sliding scale that depends upon the bond
required for licensing. The assessments range from a minimum of $750
to a maximum of $1000 per licensee annually for the first three years and
one-half of those amounts thereafter.254 After the first three years, no fees
are assessed if the fund's reserves are above the targeted $3 million.
255
242. OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 9-45 (West Supp. 1983-1984).
243. Id. § 9-44.
244. Id.
245. Id. § 9-45.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-41-230 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983). The fund is financed by
assessments levied on grain farmers and collected by grain dealers at the time of sale. Id. § 46-
41-220. The assessments are one cent per bushel on soybeans (a higher value crop) and one-
half cent per bushel on other grains. Id. Assessments are suspended when the fund actually
has $6 million on hand. Id. § 46-41-230. The fund's goal is to pay 100% of a farmer's loss in a
dealer insolvency. Unmet farmer claims are carried over for payment in following years. Id
However, the fund's administrator may reduce the payments of claims if he believes that such
payments would jeopardize the fund. Ia Farmers' claims are to be paid within 30 days of
submission to the fund. Depending upon the amount in the fund, such payment would consti-
tute 25-100% of loss. Id
249. This amount is based on the average farm size, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note
2, at 652, average yield of state's leading grain crop, id at 663, 673, and average price for that
crop, id at 676 (1982 statistics).
250. This amount is estimated as in note 249. Because soybeans, the higher assessment
crop, is also the leading grain crop, the true cost is probably lower.
251. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 114, §§ 701-712 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985).
252. Id. § 5(c).
253. Id. §§ 5(a)-(c), 13.
254. Id.
255. Id. § 5(c).
The Illinois fund compensates unpaid farmer-sellers in a grain eleva-
tor insolvency "for 85% of a valid claim, to a maximum of $100,000. ' ' 256
Moreover, if the fund lacks enough money to cover the claims against it
for a given insolvency, the fund statute directs the Illinois Legislature to
provide the needed additional money from general revenues. 2 7
The Illinois fund uses an assessment method which obscures the
probable passing on of the cost to farmers. 258 Conversion of the total
annual fees to a per-bushel basis, however, suggests an estimated cost of
$13 annually for the average farmer in the state.259
The protection provided by government insurance funds like those
of Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Illinois is impressive. Because the
protection is independent of federal bankruptcy law, its legal effective-
ness is unqualified. The cost to the farmer is remarkably low, yet the
coverage against loss is complete or nearly complete. Although other
state insurance funds pertain only to grain crops, other crops are in-
cluded in the California context.
The government insurance method is a superior alternative to the
California producer's lien because it provides protection for California
farmers without significantly raising their costs. The economy of the
scheme is illustrated by an estimate of the cost to California farmers of
an enlarged California Farm Products Trust Fund. Because California is
the largest state in agricultural production,260 a fund of $10 million
seems appropriate. Assume that the fund is accumulated over a period
of five years, at $2 million in total assessments per year. Also, adopt the
fairer concept of fee assessments based on crop value rather than physical
measure. 261 Based on these assumptions, the estimated cost of such a
fund would be less than $25 annually for an average farmer in the
state.262 The benefit of this protection far outweighs the annual cost.
The California Legislature should provide this kind of large insurance
fund.
256. Id. § 8(a). Coverage is 100% for stored grain. Id.
257. Id. § 7. If the legislature fails to act, the state treasurer is directed to transfer the
money to the fund anyway. Id.
258. See supra notes 253-54 & accompanying text.
259. The annual total of license fees is allocated to an average size farm, see supra note
249, based on two leading crops, corn and soybeans.
260. See supra note 2 & accompanying text.
261. See supra note 248 & accompanying text.
262. The $25 annual fee is calculated based on an average farm size, an average yield and
price for all crops combined, and an allocation of the $2 million assessments based on the value
of the average farmer's marketed crops. For the figures used in the calculation, see CAL. DEP'T
OF FOOD & AGRIC., CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURE SUMMARY-1982 at 2-3 (1983) (average
yield and price for crops); id. at 10 (average size).
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Require High-Coverage Bonding of Processors
Prior to the establishment of state insurance funds, surety bonding
was the typical protective device mandated by statute.263 California-f0r-
merly required processors to post a bond in order to obtain a license.264
Although business failure was one of the hazards the bond was intended
to cover,265 the amount of coverage required, $5000,266 was far too low to
cover potential claims in a processor insolvency. Bonding was replaced in
1977 by the greater, but still inadequate, coverage of the Farm Products
Trust Fund.
267
Conceivably, the Legislature could require processors to post a bond
of meaningful size, for example, $3 million or more. Bonding, however, is
usually limited to losses resulting from willful acts, such as violations of
licensing requirements and failure to appear in court.268 In that respect,
bonding differs from insurance, which creates a pool of funds to cover
virtually certain but randomly distributed occurrences of losses in a large
class of events.269 When bonding is required for full coverage of financial
obligations, rates are high. For such a financial guarantee bond, annual
rates would probably be $10 to $20 per $1000 of the principal amount,
270
which amounts to $30,000 to $60,000 for a $3 million bond. The surety
industry is reluctant to write such large bonds covering deferred payment
contracts.271 Moreover, in the Richards example, such a bond expense
for the processor, if passed along, would imply an annual cost of approxi-
mately $230 to $460 per farmer.272 This cost is much higher than for the
insurance alternatives discussed in the preceding and following sections
of this Note.
On the ground of high cost alone, high-coverage bonding of proces-
263. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 114, § 214.8 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985) (as
amended 1983).
264. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§ 55551-55561 (repealed by Act of Sept. 16, 1977, ch.
876, § 2, 1977 Cal. Stat. 2638).
265. Id. §§ 55554, 55557 (failure to meet financial obligations and violations of licensing
requirements are both covered by the bond).
266. Id. § 55551.
267. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§ 56701-56733 (West Supp. 1985) (presently, § 56708
authorizes payment of no more than $50,000 in claims against any one processor). As the
number of canneries declines, see supra notes 3-4 & accompanying text, the survivors are doing
larger volumes of business.
268. W. CONNORS, CALIFORNIA SURETY AND FIDELITY BOND PRACTICE §§ 1.2-.4
(1969).
269. J. BACKMAN, SURETY RATE-MAKING: A STUDY OF THE ECONOMICS OF SURETY-
SHIP 28, 30, 34-35 (1948).
270. Letter from W.L. Kelley, Manager of Surety Department of The Surety Association
of America, to author (Sept. 26, 1984) (copy on file with the Hastings Law Journal).
271. Id. The industry had a disastrous experience with mortgage guarantee bonds in the
Depression. J. BACKMAN, supra note 269, at 175, 382.
272. This cost is calculated from Debtor's Statement of Affairs, In re T.H. Richards
Processing Co., No. 282-2614-W-7 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. filed July 9, 1982).
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sors is not recommended as a method of protecting farmers in processor
insolvencies.
Private Insurance
Farmers could protect themselves, without any legislative interven-
tion, by purchasing private insurance against buyer insolvencies. But
such insurance apparently has been available only to grain farmers in
Illinois, Iowa, and Minnesota.273 Private insurance was withdrawn in
Illinois when the state created its own insurance fund.27
4
The provisions of these policies illustrate what a private insurance
alternative could offer. The policies offered by Farm-Bureau affiliated
companies provided coverage up to $200,000 per member. In Illinois the
1983-1984 annual premium cost ranged from $36 for $50,000 coverage to
$87 for $200,000.275 In Iowa, the 1984-1985 premiums ranged from $50
for $50,000 to $95 for $200,000.276 The Illinois policy was limited to $10
million in claims for any one elevator insolvency and to $50 million for
all insolvencies in any one year,277 the Iowa policy to $10 million and
$25 million, respectively. 27
8
These policies protect farmers who have entered into deferred pay-
ment contracts from the long exposure to risk of loss. In Illinois, for
example, the policies protected insured farmers who contracted for the
sale of grain up to thirteen months prior to an elevator insolvency.
279
The Iowa policy covered sales for two years.280 In general, the policies
did not provide for payment in full for a farmer's loss, and the proportion
of loss payable declined depending on how long after sale the insolvency
occurred. The policies paid 80% of the farmer's loss for the first ninety
days after delivery of grain to the buyer.281 Thereafter, the proportion of
loss payable declined one percent a week until it reached 65% in Illi-
nois282 and 60% in Iowa. 283 Thus, even with the insurance, a farmer
would be exposed to a substantial loss in an elevator insolvency, espe-
cially on a long deferred payment contract.
The lack of complete protection was partially offset by provision for
273. The policies examined were issued by Country Mutual Insurance Co. in Illinois [here-
inafter cited as Illinois Policy], and by Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. in Iowa and Minne-
sota [hereinafter cited as Iowa Policy] (The Minnesota policy terms were in all respects
identical to the Iowa terms.).
274. Telephone interview with official from Country Mutual Insurance Co. (Aug. 1984).
275. Illinois Policy, supra note 273.
276. Iowa Policy, supra note 273.
277. Illinois Policy, supra note 273.
278. Iowa Policy, supra note 273.
279. Illinois Policy, supra note 273.
280. Iowa Policy, supra note 273.
281. Illinois Policy, supra note 273; Iowa Policy, supra note 273.
282. Illinois Policy, supra note 273.
283. Iowa Policy, supra note 273.
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quick payment of insured losses. Within thirty days of the farmer's sub-
mission of his claim, the Illinois policy would pay 60% of the insured
proportion of the prospective loss, that is, 39-48% of the loss. 284 The
Iowa policy paid 50%, that is, 30-40% of the loss, within thirty days.
28 5
The advance payment feature is significant because even secured credi-
tors may have to wait two years or more for distributions in
bankruptcy.
286
Private insurance can provide low cost, albeit incomplete, financial
protection to farmers. The protection does not depend on legislation at
the state or federal level. The private insurance method, however, does
impose a burden of choice on farmers: they must decide that they need
the protection and then pay the premium directly, rather than indirectly
in crop prices. Unfortunately, this small burden has proved too large for
farmers offered the insurance opportunity. In Iowa, for example, Farm
Bureau Mutual Insurance Company was unable over several years to sell
enough policies for commercial viability.287 The company must sell 8000
to 12,000 policies annually to make the policy commercially feasible, but
in 1984 only 2500 policies were sold.288 Consequently, the policy will not
be offered in 1985.289
Lacking adequate legislated protection, California farmers would be
well advised to seek private insurance against processing company insol-
vencies. California farm organizations could undoubtedly arrange an of-
fering of such insurance in this state, if it were financially viable. The
Iowa experience, however, suggests that California farmers might not
buy the policies, even if they were available.
A related issue is whether legislation is appropriate to protect those
farmers who are capable of protecting themselves, but nevertheless do
not. The solicitude expressed by Senator Dole 90 for the economic vul-
nerability of farmers suggests that all farmers should receive the benefit
of legislated protection.
The courts, however, have answered this policy question more am-
biguously. Several courts have been asked to decide whether farmers
284. Illinois Policy, supra note 273.
285. Iowa Policy, supra note 273.
286. For example, in In re T.H. Richards Processing Co., No. 282-2614-W-7 (Bankr. E.D.
Cal. filed July 9, 1982), farmers have not received what they are owed in more than two years.
287. In Illinois the policy was withdrawn before a full market test because the state estab-
lished a government insurance fund. Telephone interview with official from Country Mutual
Insurance Co. (Aug. 1984).
288. Telephone interview with official from Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. (Aug.
1984) (vigorous marketing effort in counties which experienced grain elevator insolvencies pro-
duced only meager policy sales).
289. Telephone interview with official from Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. (Aug.
1984).
290. 127 CONG. REc. S9832 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1981); see supra text accompanying note
209.
should be regarded as merchants under the Uniform Commercial
Code.291 The issue is whether a farmer should be seen "as a simple tiller
of the soil, unaccustomed to the affairs of business and the market-
place, '2 92 or as one "whose occupation includes the selling of a commod-
ity. . . [and who] necessarily represents. . . that he has knowledge of
the practices and goods involved in" marketing his crops. 293 Courts in
South Dakota,294 Iowa,295 Kansas, 296 Utah,297 Wisconsin, 298 Arkan-
sas,299 and Alabama 3°° have treated farmers as nonmerchants; Illinois,30 1
Texas, 30 2 and Ohio 303 have treated the farmer as a merchant. An Ohio
court remarked that "[f]arming is no longer confined to simple labor.
Only an agribusinessman may hope to survive. '' 30 4 The view that a
farmer is a simple tiller of the soil seems incongruous in this era of elabo-
rate futures markets, deferred payment contracts, and increasingly com-
plex agricultural technologies. The Ohio court's view recognizes the
reality of modem farming.
Legislative protection for farmers who are running complex, mod-
em agribusinesses can be justified. Farmers are likely to pay, whether
directly or indirectly, for any form of protection from processor insolven-
cies. Therefore, as long as the cost of protection is not diverted to tax-
payers at large, legislated relief for farmers should not be objectionable.
Legislated relief can be seen as a matter of coordinating protection for
those who do not manage on their own initiative to provide as much
protection at as low a cost.
A Best Way?
The preceding sections of this Note have considered six methods for
giving California farmers better protection in processing company insol-
vencies: improving the producer's lien, changing federal bankruptcy law,
291. See generally Henkel & Shedd, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Is a
Farmer a "Merchant" or a "Tiller of the Soil"?, 18 AM. Bus. L.J. 323 (1980). "Whether a
farmer is a merchant sounds rather basic, but this question has been surprisingly difficult for
courts to resolve." Id. at 336.
292. Ohio Grain Co. v. Swisshelm, 40 Ohio App. 2d 203, 206, 318 N.E.2d 428, 430 (1973).
293. Nelson v. Union Equity Co-op. Exch., 548 S.W.2d 352, 356 (Tex. 1977); see Annot.,
95 A.L.R.3d 484 (1979).
294. Terminal Grain Corp. v. Freeman, 270 N.W.2d 806 (S.D. 1978).
295. Sand Seed Serv., Inc. v. Poeckes, 249 N.W.2d 663 (Iowa 1977).
296. Decatur Coop. Ass'n v. Urban, 219 Kan. 171, 547 P.2d 323 (1976).
297. Lish v. Compton, 547 P.2d 223 (Utah 1976).
298. Gerner v. Vasby, 75 Wis. 2d 660, 250 N.W.2d 319 (1977).
299. Cook Grains v. Fallis, 239 Ark. 962, 395 S.W.2d 555 (1965).
300. Loeb & Co. v. Schreiner, 294 Ala. 722, 321 So. 2d 199 (1975).
301. Sierens v. Clausen, 60 Ill. 2d 585, 328 N.E.2d 559 (1975).
302. Nelson, 548 S.W.2d 352.
303. Ohio Grain, 40 Ohio App. 2d 203, 318 N.E.2d 428.
304. Id. at 206, 318 N.E.2d at 430.
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providing a state or federal statutory trust, establishing a large state in-
surance fund, requiring high-coverage bonding of processors, and offer-
ing private insolvency insurance. Implementation of any one of these
methods, with the possible exception of the legally vulnerable state-cre-
ated statutory trust, would offer farmers substantial relief from poten-
tially heavy losses in a processor insolvency. None of the approaches are
cost-free, although some, especially the state insurance fund, are very
inexpensive.
In terms of the scope of financial relief from losses, the ranking of
probable effectiveness is: state insurance fund, federal statutory trust,
high-coverage bonding, a valid federal or state statutory lien, private in-
surance, and federal priority in bankruptcy. The first three of these
could be designed to provide nearly total payment of a farmer's prospec-
tive loss. The effectiveness of the valid liens to cover losses depends on
whether secured creditors receive complete payment on their collateral in
a given insolvency. The state insurance fund and private insurance poli-
cies should provide the quickest repayment of all or part of the loss be-
cause they would not depend upon the conclusion of federal bankruptcy
proceedings.
In terms of the advance cost of relief, there is probably a broad divi-
sion between methods which create the likelihood of higher financing
costs for processors and those which would not. Thus, the methods that
would afford relief to farmers at the apparent expense of secured lenders,
the valid liens and the statutory trusts, would be the most costly. Higher
bonding requirements would be intermediate in cost. Cheaper protection
would be afforded by insurance methods and by a federal priority in
bankruptcy.
Combining these evaluations, a large state insurance fund seems the
best method of protection for California farmers overall. The protection
can be very cheap, complete, and prompt. In contrast, an improved Cali-
fornia producer's lien is one of the least desirable methods. The protec-
tion, though potentially complete, is slow and expensive. Farmers, and
their advocates before the California Legislature, should seek a vastly
improved Farm Products Trust Fund, rather than further amendments
to the producer's lien.
Conclusion
California farmers selling their crops to processing companies that
become insolvent have been exposed to serious financial losses. Califor-
nia has provided two protections for such farmers: the producer's lien
and the Farm Products Trust Fund. The Fund is presently grossly inad-
equate in scope. The producer's lien is subject to challenge as an invalid
state priority in federal bankruptcy proceedings. Although the pro-
ducer's lien survived an initial test in Richards under section 545(2) of
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the Bankruptcy Code, an analysis of the federal case law suggests that
the lien is likely to be invalidated on appeal.
The California Legislature easily could ensure the validity of the
producer's lien in bankruptcy by adding appropriate bona fide purchaser
language and by providing for the recording of the lien. These amend-
ments, however, should be enacted only after serious consideration of
alternative methods of protecting farmers, including the legal and finan-
cial effectiveness and costs of those alternative methods. Upon close in-
spection of the alternatives, a strengthened producer's lien statute
diminishes in desirability. Protection that is cheaper, and yet more effec-
tive, could be provided by an enlarged California Farm Products Trust
Fund.
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